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CASENOTES
ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY V.
AD VANTAGE RENT-A-CAR, INC.:
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BARS DILUTION BASED
OPPOSITION OF A MARK USED BEFORE AN
OPPOSING MARK BECAME FAMOUS
Jefferson F. Schert and Colby B. Springerl
In Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc.,1
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered its
first construction of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.2 On
appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the Federal
Circuit faced the issue of whether an opposition proceeding based on
dilution can be maintained when the applicant for a mark had been
t Jefferson F. Scher is a partner with Carr & Ferrell LLP, in Palo Alto, California,
where he serves as chairman of the firm's trademark practice group. Jefferson specializes in
intellectual property counseling and litigation, with an emphasis on copyright and trademark
protection and enforcement on the Internet. Jefferson counsels a wide range of companies on
setting up and maintaining procedures to protect their intellectual property through copyrights,
patents, trade secrets and trademarks, avoiding infringing the rights of others and enforcing their
intellectual property rights. Jefferson is a frequent speaker, and a lecturer at Santa Clara
University School of Law, on trademark and domain name issues.
I Colby B. Springer is an associate with Carr & Ferrell LLP, in Palo Alto, California,
where he works in the intellectual property and litigation practice groups. Colby has experience
in all fields of intellectual property law, especially with regard to copyright and the Internet.
Colby has published numerous articles on intellectual property law including domain names, the
balance of intellectual property and antitrust law and the scope and limits of copyright
protection. Colby is a lecturer at Santa Clara University School of Law where he teaches
courses in international intellectual property, protection of intellectual property and appellate
advocacy and brief writing.
1. 330 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the "FTDA")
allows the owner of a "famous mark" to, inter alia, enjoin "another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
Determining whether a mark is famous is a multi-faceted evaluation, including the inherent
distinctiveness of the mark, the duration and extent of its use and the degree of recognition of
the mark in certain trading areas or channels of trade. Id.
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used only in a limited geographic area before the opposing party's
mark became famous.3 The court also considered whether a state
dilution statute could serve as the basis for a federal opposition
proceeding.4
The Federal Circuit rejected the opposer Enterprise's arguments
on both points. As long as the applicant's use was "in commerce"
within the meaning of the Lanham Act, "the owner of a famous mark
cannot oppose registration based on dilution where its mark did not
achieve fame prior to the applicant's use in a limited geographic
area." 5 The Federal Circuit found no evidence that Congress intended
to add state dilution statutes to the grounds for opposition to a federal
trademark application.6 Because the Federal Circuit's statutory
interpretation applies equally to District Court proceedings, it presents
yet another hurdle for trademark holders seeking relief under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
I. OPPOSITIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
Historically, trademark law, and proceedings before the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the "Board"), have focused on
protecting consumers from being misled by confusingly similar
marks.7 Protection against trademark dilution, on the other hand, is
"not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers' 8 but, instead,
"to protect a mark's owner from dilution of the mark's value and
uniqueness." 9 States began enacting anti-dilution statutes in 1947,
enabling trademark holder to enjoin the use of similar marks
"notwithstanding the absence of competition or the absence of
confusion as to the source of goods or services."' Some states
provided this heightened protection only for "famous" marks," while
others imposed no such requirement. 2
In 1995, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(the "FTDA") in an effort to "bring uniformity and consistency to the
protection of famous marks" through a federal civil remedy, allowing
3. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1334.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1334-35.
6. Id. at 1335.
7. See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
8. Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003).
9. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1339-40.
10. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. I IOB, § 12 (1999).
11. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 4-71-213 (Michie 2001).
12. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Corn. Code Ann. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002).
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trademark owners to bypass the myriad state remedies they deemed
"unpredictable and inadequate" as a means of protecting marks. 13
While the FTDA did not preempt state anti-dilution laws entirely, it
did bar the use of those laws against the owner of a federally
registered mark "with respect to that mark."'14 This was meant to
"protect registered marks used in [interstate] commerce from
interference by state, or territorial legislation.''
5
In passing the FTDA, Congress did not add dilution as a basis
for opposition to registration under section 13 (15 U.S.C. § 1063) or as
grounds for cancellation under section 14 (15 U.S.C. § 1064), and in
Babson Bros. v. Surge Power, the Board declined to entertain the new
cause of action as grounds for opposition.' 6 Congress remedied this
omission in the Trademark Amendments Act of 1999 by providing
that "any person who believes that he would be damaged by the
registration of a mark upon the principal register, including as a result
of dilution under section 1125(c) ... [to] file an opposition" as to
registration of the same.' 7  In making the amendment, the House
specifically referred to Babson as the impetus for "further legislation"
and providing holders of famous marks "a right to oppose or seek
cancellation of a mark that would cause dilution as provided in the




II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The dispute between Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company
("Enterprise") and Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. ("Advantage") began
more than five years ago. Enterprise, whose familiar television
commercials feature cars in brown paper wrappers, pioneered the
practice of picking up its rental car customers as early as 1974. It was
not until twenty years later, in 1994, that Enterprise began promoting
the service marks "Pick the Company that Picks You Up" and "Pick
Enterprise, We'll Pick You Up" in its national advertising and printed
materials. 19 Enterprise was awarded federal trademark registrations
13. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000).
15. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
16. See Babson Bros. Co. v. Surge Power Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1953, 1954-55 (TTAB
1996).
17. H.R. 1565, 106th Cong. (1999); 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(2000).
18. H.R. REP. No. 106-250 at 4--5 (1999).
19. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
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for these phrases in 1996,20 and for "We'll Pick You Up" in 1997.21
Unbeknownst to the Saint Louis-based Enterprise, Advantage
Rent-A-Car, Inc. ("Advantage"), based in San Antonio, Texas, had
begun using the phrase "We'll Even Pick You Up" in 1990.22
Advantage used the phrase only in television commercials. Such
commercials were broadcast locally in San Antonio approximately
100 times between 1992 and 1995, and in Arkansas, Louisiana, New
Mexico and Texas 289 times between August 1997 and April 1998.23
Eventually the two companies became aware of one another and,
on June 16, 1998, Advantage filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging claims for unfair
competition under section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act and the
common law of Texas.2 4 Advantage further sought cancellation of
Enterprise's federal registrations under § 1119. 25  Enterprise
counterclaimed, alleging both unfair competition and trademark
dilution under state and federal law.2 6
The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction resulted from a federal
trademark application that Advantage filed for the mark "We'll Even
Pick You Up" during the pendency of the Texas proceeding. 27 Less
than a week after Advantage's application was published for
opposition, Enterprise filed its Notice of Opposition alleging it would
be damaged by the registration of Advantage's mark "because
Advantage's mark caused dilution of Enterprise's mark" under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act. The opposition proceeding was
suspended in light of the civil action.
28
In Texas, the parties dropped their respective unfair competition
claims and proceeded to a bench trial solely on Enterprise's
20. "Pick Enterprise, We'll Pick You Up" (U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,948,828 Jan. 16,
1996); "Pick the Company that Picks You Up" (U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,953,083 Jan. 30,
1996).
21. "We'll Pick You Up" (U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 2,085,472 Aug. 5, 1997).
22. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1336.
23. Id.
24. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (Providing for "a civil action" where
there exists use of a mark "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association" with that of a second mark.).
25. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1336. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2000) (Providing for
"cancellation of registrations" in "any action involving a registered mark.").
26. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1336.
27. See id. (citing Application Ser. No. 75-697,875).
28. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2000) (Allowing "any person who believes that
he would be damaged by the registration of a mark upon the principal register, including as a
result of dilution under section 1125(c) of this title, may... file an opposition.").
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counterclaim for trademark dilution.2 9  The district court entered
judgment against Enterprise finding its slogans not to be "sufficiently
famous or distinctive to receive protection under the [FTDA]. 3°
Determining fame to be a requirement of the asserted state dilution
statutes, the district court found the aforementioned lack of fame to
prevent recovery on the state claims.31 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's
determination that Enterprise's marks were insufficiently famous to
warrant relief under the federal, Arkansas and New Mexico statute,
but remanded for further proceedings under the Texas and Louisiana
statute.
A few weeks after the Fifth Circuit's ruling, the Board resumed
the opposition proceeding, eventually granting summary judgment to
Advantage. The Board first invoked resjudicata, as both the district
and appeals court found Enterprise's marks to be insufficiently
famous to support a dilution claim.33  The Board then rejected
Enterprise's argument that its mark had become famous after the time
period considered by the Texas litigation but before Applicant's
expansion into a new geographic area. The Board read the FTDA
literally in its requirement that "a party seeking to invoke dilution as a
ground for cancellation must establish that its mark became famous
prior to applicant's first use of the mark., 34 As Enterprise could not
"establish that its mark was famous prior to [Advantage's] use-
anywhere in the country" it could not prevail under a dilution
theory.35 The Board also rejected Enterprise's argument that state
anti-dilution statutes provided an adequate basis for cancellation
concluding it lacked proper "jurisdiction to decide issues arising
under state dilution law.",36 Enterprise appealed.
29. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1336.
30. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., No. A 98CA 372, slip op. at 1
(W.D. Tex. May 24, 1999).
31. Id. at 10.
32. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 238 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir.
2001) (Texas and Louisiana statutes require only distinctiveness, not fame).
33. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1857, 1860
(TTAB 2002).





494 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 20
Ill. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF DILUTION AND THE
ENTERPRISE OPPOSITION
On appeal, Enterprise did not challenge the findings of the Fifth
Circuit or district court that its mark did not possess the requisite fame
required by the FTDA "as of the late 1990s.,, 37 Instead, Enterprise
pressed its argument that Advantage's prior use of the mark in a
limited geographic area 38 did not serve as a complete bar to
allegations of later acquired fame and subsequent dilution in the
opposition proceeding.39 The Federal Circuit disagreed, affirming the
Board's ruling on every point.
The Federal Circuit began with the plain language of the statute
entitling the owner of a famous mark to an injunction "against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name if such
use begins after the mark has become famous., 40 The Federal Circuit
found that while "such use" could be read to refer "to a particular
geographic area in which there would have been no prior use by the
defendant"--thereby supporting Enterprise's argument-such an
interpretation was "not a tenable reading of the statute.",4' Congress
intended to provide a nationwide remedy and to resolve the problems
of forum-shopping and multi-jurisdictional litigation that resulted
from the "patch-quilt system of protection" under the state anti-
dilution laws.42 Accordingly, the FTDA "did not contemplate suits
limited to particular geographic areas. '' 3 The Federal Circuit thus
agreed with the Board that "'such use' must refer to any use in
commerce," finding it significant that the statute imposed "no
qualification ... that the defendant's prior use be substantial or cover
a wide geographic area to defeat an injunction. . ... 44
37. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
38. That is, San Antonio, Texas, as well as Louisiana, Arkansas and New Mexico. Id. at
1337.
39. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1341.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
41. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1341.
42. Id at 1341-42 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4).
43. Id. at 1342.
44. Enterprise, 330 F.3d. at 1342 (noting that the FTDA's criteria for determining the
fame of a mark include consideration of the geographic extent of the trademark holder's trading
area) (emphasis added); see also 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)(D). The Federal Circuit deemed the
absence of a corresponding reference particularly telling, referring to the Supreme Court's
directive in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983). In Russello, the Supreme Court
found "[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acted intentionally and
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The court was underwhelmed by Enterprise's analogy to
concurrent use proceedings, in which the Board is empowered to
grant registrations to two users of a mark in different territories. In
such as proceeding, Enterprise, as the junior user with the first
registration would be entitled to limit Advantage's registration to the
few states in which it had prior use.45 The Federal Circuit found it
"clear that Congress rejected this approach" in connection with
dilution.46  Section2(d) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.
section1052(d)) provides for concurrent use registrations limited in
"the mode or place of use" of the respective marks as an exception to
the general rule that registration must be refused if there is a
likelihood of confusion. When Congress amended the Lanham Act to
add dilution as a ground for opposition, it also amended § 1052 to
prevent consideration of dilution during the ex parte examination
process: "A mark which when used would cause dilution... may be
refused registration only pursuant to a[n opposition] proceeding
brought under section 1063 of this title. ' 47 As section 13 does not
provide for concurrent use registrations, the court ruled that the
omission "must be seen as a deliberate choice made by Congress. 48
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision that
Congress had not authorized the Board to consider allegations under
state anti-dilution statute in opposition proceedings. Contrary to
Enterprise's arguments, the 1999 amendments were intended
specifically and exclusively to embrace "dilution under § 1125(c). ' 49
Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history would
support a departure from settled law that refusal of registration must
be based on explicit authority in the Lanham Act.50  Such an
interpretation would run counter to the language of the Lanham Act
itself whereby it seeks "to protect registered marks used in commerce
from interference by state or territorial legislation.'
IV. COMMENTS
The Federal Circuit was emphatic: "any prior use, even in a
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Id. at 23; Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1342.
45. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1342-43.
46. See id. at 1343 ("Enterprise contends it should be treated like a junior user that has
obtained registration").
47. Id. at 1343; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (2000) (emphasis added).
48. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1343; Russello, 464 U.S. at 23.
49. Id. at 1344.
50. Id. at 1343.
51. Id. at 1344 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
2004]
496 SANTA CL.ARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 1.. [Vol. 20
limited geographic area, defeats a claim of dilution in a civil action
under section 1125(c) [which] leads to the conclusion that it defeats
an opposition to registration based on dilution under section 1063.,52
The court may have overstated the breadth of its holding, however,
when it referred to "any use by the accused infringer" and
Advantage's use of its slogan "in the San Antonio, Texas, area" to
defeat the opposition.53 In fact, the statute requires the accused
infringer to have used its mark "in commerce" prior to the asserted
mark having become famous. Use of a mark within a single state or
metropolitan area will not always be deemed to "affect commerce"
for purposes of the Lanham Act, and therefore the Federal Circuit's
language should not be read too literally.
This ambiguity aside, the Federal Circuit's reasoning appears to
be sound and its decision likely will be persuasive on the district
courts in other circuits deciding cases under the FTDA. The unusual
facts of the case, however, raise a number of interesting questions for
trademark practitioners.
First, how could a client learn of the use of a mark solely in
television advertisements? Searching for unregistered prior uses of
marks always has been a challenge, but in the case of radio and
television advertising, there may be no written record and, therefore,
no searchable archive of such uses. Even in the absence of
infringement liability, such "stealth" uses could defeat an injunction
under the FTDA, substantially reducing the value of a trademark.
Second, a company faced with potential exposure under the
FTDA should strongly consider the possibility of acquiring prior
rights from another party in the same field. Even if such rights are
only regional, they could provide a complete defense to an injunction.
Naturally, one would be well advised to observe the usual
requirements for continuity and the formalities of transfer in making
such an acquisition.
Third, the Federal Circuit's ruling continues a trend among the
federal courts toward reining in the reach of the FTDA. Read in
conjunction with other Circuits' increasingly stringent requirements
for proof that a mark has become famous, the Enterprise decision
places another hurdle in the path of trademark holders seeking relief
under section 1143(c). Its significance for Board practice is only the
tip of the iceberg.
52. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1343.
53. Id.
